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Remittances and the Brain Drain: 
Skilled Migrants Do Remit Less
*
 
It has been argued that the brain drain’s negative impact may be offset by the higher 
remittance levels skilled migrants send home. This paper examines whether remittances 
actually increase with migrants’ education level. The determinants of remittances it considers 
include migration levels or rates, migrants’ education level, and source countries’ income, 
financial sector development and expected growth rate. The estimation takes potential 
endogeneity into account, an issue not considered in the few studies on this topic. Our main 
finding is that remittances decrease with the share of migrants with tertiary education. This 
provides an additional reason for which source countries would prefer unskilled to skilled 
labor migration. Moreover, as predicted by our model, remittances increase with source 
countries’ level and rate of migration, financial sector development and population, and 
decrease with these countries’ income and expected growth rate. 
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* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessary represent those of 
the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent. 1. Introduction 
  Recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in migrant remittances to developing 
countries. Officially recorded remittances – measured as the sum of workers’ remittances, 
compensation of employees and migrant transfers – are estimated to have increased from US$58 
billion in 1995 to US$167 billion in 2005, with recent estimates putting their level at over $200 
billion. This growth rate has outpaced that of private capital flows and official development 
assistance over the last decade, making remittances the second largest source of external funding 
for developing countries after foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2005).  
The recent increase in formal remittance flows can be explained by the increase in the 
number and income of migrants, the greater number of remittance providers, wider networks in 
the global financial services industry, and government policies that improve financial market 
access, all of which have reduced remittance costs and promoted the use of official remittance 
channels (Freund and Spatafora, 2005; World Bank, 2005). Whatever the reasons behind this 
surge, the growing importance of remittances as a source of foreign exchange and their 
contribution to economic development have attracted increasing attention from policy-makers and 
academics alike.  
One of the issues much discussed in recent years is the impact of migrants’ education 
level on remittance flows. It has been argued in the migration and remittance literature that the 
negative impact of the brain drain can be offset by the remittances skilled migrants send to their 
family back home (e.g. Ratha, 2003).
1 Though it is clear that skilled migrants send remittances 
back home, the question remains as to whether they remit more or less than unskilled migrants. A 
necessary – though not sufficient – condition for skilled migrants to generate a smaller loss for 
their home country than unskilled ones is for skilled migrants to remit more than the unskilled 
                                                 
1 Another argument is that source countries benefit from skilled migrants’ contribution to technology 
transfer to the home country (Burns and Mohapatra, 2008)). On the other hand, Schiff and Wang (2008) 
show that the brain drain reduces technology absorption and productivity growth in source countries.  
  1ones. To date, however, empirical studies have been unable to establish – at acceptable statistical 
significance levels – whether remittances increase with migrants’ education level or not..  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on remittances and migrants’ 
education by i) presenting a richer model than in previous studies and deriving additional testable 
hypotheses, ii) showing for the first time (as far as we know) that remittances decrease with 
migrants’ level of education; iii) providing a richer empirical analysis, enabling us to estimate the 
relationship between remittances and other variables of interest, such as home countries’ expected 
economic growth and their level of financial development; and iv) accounting for the endogeneity 
of migration and migrants’ education level, something previous studies have abstracted from.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a selective review of the 
existing work on the determinants of remittances. Section 3 introduces a model of the relationship 
between the brain drain and remittance flows, and derives testable implications from it. Section 4 
examines some of the major variables of interest, while Section 5 specifies the econometric 
model. Section 6 provides a brief description of the data and Section 7 presents the estimation 
results. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Literature on Determinants of Remittances 
  The existing literature on the determinants of remittances is largely based on micro-
econometric analyses. Many of the studies examine migrants’ motives to remit, namely altruism 
and self-interest. Altruism would imply a negative relationship between recipients’ income and 
remittances sent home, as found in McGarry and Shoeni (1995) for the US and Aggarwal and 
Horowitz (2002) for Guyana, while self-interest might imply a positive relationship.  
  Similarly, migrants’ altruism would imply a negative relationship between remittances 
and recipients’ expected income growth, while self-interest might imply a positive relationship. 
  2The relationship is examined both theoretically and empirically with respect to both actual 
income and expected income growth. The latter has not been studied before.
2   
Though the literature has focused on microeconomic determinants, a number of country 
studies have examined the relationship between remittance flows and macroeconomic variables 
(e.g., Straubhaar, 1986; El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Chami, et al. 2003; Freund and Spatafora, 
2005; Gupta, 2005). Nonetheless, the empirical evidence regarding the remittance impact of key 
variables is inconclusive. For instance, using Turkish data, Straubhaar (1986) finds that 
remittance flows are not affected by changes in exchange rates or in the real rate of return on 
investment. Gupta (2005) obtains the same results for India but also shows that economic activity 
in host countries are important determinants of remittances. In contrast, El-Sakka and McNabb 
(1999) find that exchange rate and interest rate differentials are important in attracting 
remittances to Egypt.  
This paper focuses on migrants’ education level, another potentially important 
determinant of remittances. Skilled migrants tend to earn more than unskilled ones and can thus 
afford to send more remittances to their families back home. On the other hand, they often come 
from better-off families whose demand for remittances may be lower than that of poorer ones. 
Moreover, their greater ability to bring over their family members, and do so more rapidly, also 
reduces their incentive to remit. Which of these effects dominates is ambiguous a priori.  
Given that developed countries’ immigration policies increasingly favor skilled migrants, 
whether they remit more or less than unskilled migrants has important policy implications for 
migrants’ home countries. Unfortunately, the findings obtained are inconclusive. Faini (2007) 
obtains a negative non-significant impact of migrants’ education on remittances,
3 Naufal (2007) 
                                                 
2 In fact, Rapoport and Docquier (2006) show that altruism and self-interest share many common 
predictions. They review a set of empirical studies and find that a mixture of self-interested and altruistic 
motives explains the likelihood and size of remittances.  
 
3 Moreover, endogeneity of migration and migrants’ education level is not taken into account in Faini’s 
analysis, and the education variable used is not necessarily positively related to migrants’ education level. 
  3obtains a positive non-significant impact, and Rodriguez and Horton (1994) find no impact for 
the Philippines.  
Another factor that may affect formal remittance flows is home countries’ financial sector 
development. Few studies have looked at this issue. An exception is Freund and Spatafora (2005). 
They show, first, that home countries’ financial development has a significantly positive impact 
on formal remittance flows, mainly because it reduces the cost of sending remittances through 
formal channels, and second, that the increase in formal remittances is essentially due to the 
reduction in informal remittances associated with the decline in formal remitting costs rather than 
to an increase in the total amount of remittances.  
The following section introduces a model in order to examine the issues described above. 
 
3. Model 
The model presented in this section simplifies Faini’s (2007) model by reducing the 
number of categories of family members,
4 and extends it by ii) incorporating an analysis of the 
impact on remittances of source country income, financial development, expected economic 
growth, and population size.  
Migrants enjoy their own consumption as well as that of their family members, and enjoy 
the latter’s presence. Migrants’ utility function U is: 
 
() ( ) ( ) [ ) ( 1 ) ( S N N N N M c V f c V f L Lf W c u U ] − + + + = ,           (1) 
 
where U is increasing at a decreasing rate in all its arguments,  1 0 ≤ ≤ N f  is the share of the 
family migrants bring to the host country in period 1; L is family size (exclusive of migrants);   
is individual consumption in family group i (i is equal to migrants (M), family members in the 
i c
  4host country (N) and in the home country (S); and  ( ) M c u ,  ( ) N Lf W ,  ( ) N c V  and   are, 
respectively, the utility migrants derive from their own consumption, from the presence of  family 
members, and from the consumption by family members in the host and the home countries. 
Separabality is assumed for simplicity and clarity of exposition but has no impact on the 
qualitative results.  
() S c V
Migrants maximize U subject to three budget constraints: 
 
() ( ) [] r y c t y c r f t f L y c S S N N N N M M + = + = − + + − = , , 1 θ ,         (2) 
 
where   is individual income in group i, t (r) = transfer (remittances) per family member in the 
host (home) country, θ = cost of bringing a family member over, total transfers   and 
total remittances  . 
i y
t Lf T N =
() r f L R N − = 1
       Assuming an internal solution, the optimum is given by:  
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4 The reason is that all testable hypotheses can be derived without the “distant family members” category. 
5Note that if  ,  and   because bringing family members over and giving them 
transfers is cheaper than sending them remittances, and their presence raises migrants’ utility. If 
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S N M N c V c V c u r t Lf W ′ = ′ = ′ < − + ′ θ  for existing values of  ,  , 
 and 
M y N y
S y θ , no family member migrates ( ). Then, changes in migrants’ education, family 
members’ income in the home country, or financial development either have no impact or, if they do, the 
impact is qualitatively the same as under the internal equilibrium.   
0
* = N f
 
6  Faini’s (2007) solution is different from equation (3) in that  ( )
*
N Lf W′  is  divided by θ  rather  than 
. The reason is that the cost migrants consider in determining   is assumed to be the real 
resource cost 
* * r t − +θ
*
N f
θ  of bringing family members over. However, the cost migrants are concerned with is the 
economic or opportunity cost  , i.e., the real resource cost 
* * r t − +θ θ  plus the difference between the 
transfers migrants make to each family member in the host and in the home country ( )
* * r t − .   
  5where asterisks denotes optimum values.  
Since  ( ) ( )
* *
S N c V c V ′ = ′ ,  . Under the plausible assumption that  , 
, so that  .  
* *
S N c c = S N y y >
s s N N y c r y c t − = < − =
* * * * θ + < <
* * * t r t
We now turn to the analysis of migrants’ education level (Section 3.2), current and 
expected future income of family members in the home country (Section 3.3), and home country 
financial development (Section 3.4).  
 
3.1. Migrants’ Education Level
Migrants’ income    tends to increase with their education level  . Equation (3) 
implies that the increase in    is spent on migrants’ and family members’ consumption 
, and on increasing the share   of family members brought to the host country. This 
means that the increase in migrants’ education has two opposite effects on remittances. Since part 
of the increase in income is spent on  , per capita remittances 
M y M E
M y
S N M c c c , , N f
S c
* r  increase. On the other hand, 
the number of remittance recipients    falls, implying that the sign of  L f N ) 1 (
* −
( ) [ ] M N M dE r f L d dE dR / 1 /
* * * − =  is  ambiguous.
7 Finally, it can be shown that the sign of 
 is also ambiguous if   and   are positively correlated with  .        M dE dR /
*
N E S E M E
 
3.2. Source Country Family Members’ Income  
In this section, we examine the impact on the optimum level of remittances 
* R  of an 
increase in  , the individual income of family members in the home country. Assuming  S y
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
7 The functional form of u, V and W must be specified in order to determine the sign of  .   M dE dR /
*
 
  6remittances remain constant initially, we have  0 > = S S dy dc  and  ( )( )( ) M N S c u c V c V ′ = ′ < ′ . 
In order to restore the equality in equation (3),  ) ( S c V′  must increase, i.e., the optimum increase 
in   is smaller than the change in  , which implies that 
*
S c S y
* r  falls. Second, the reduction in 
* r  
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Thus, remittances are negatively related to family members’ income in the home country.     
  
3.3. Financial Sector Development in the Source Country 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 assumed zero remittance (transactions) costs, in which case markets 
for informal remittance channels would not exist. This section assumes positive remittance costs 
in source countries. It first examines the impact of a change in remitting costs in the absence of 
parallel remittance channels and then in the presence of such channels.  
A positive remittance cost φ   changes the budget constraint for home-country family 
members from   to  ,  r y c S S + =
* ) 1 (
* φ − + = r y c S S ≤ < ≤ 1 0 φ , and changes the optimum to:  
  
() () () ( )
0 ) ( 1 * *
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8      ( 4 )  
 
A decrease in φ  implies that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( 1
* * *
S N M c V c V c u ′ − < ′ = ′ φ , i.e., migrants’ marginal 
utility from sending remittances increases and  ( )
*
S c V′  must fall in order to restore the equality. 
Thus,    increases. From the budget constraint, if 
*
S c
* r  is  constant,  . However,  φ d r dcS
* * − =
                                                 
8 As one would expect,   is higher – i.e., consumption is lower – in the presence of remitting costs 
than in their absence. 
) ( S c V′
  7unless the function V  is specified, it is not possible to know whether   is greater or smaller 







This result can be explained by the fact that a decline in φ  leads to opposing income and 
substitution effects on  
* r . On the one hand, migrants’ budget constraint is relaxed and they can 
now spend more on  ,   and  , leading to a decrease in  M c N c N f
* r . On the other hand, the 
reduction in φ  means that an increase in remittances leads to a larger increase in   and thus to a 
higher marginal utility for migrants, thereby providing an incentive to increase 
*
S c
* r . Consequently, 
the net effect on 
* r  is ambiguous.   
 
     3.3.1. Informal Remittance Channels
We now add informal remittance channels to the analysis, with costs such that both 
formal and informal remittance channels coexist. An increase in the level of financial 
development in the source country – including the degree of competition for, and size of networks 
of, financial services are provided – reduces remittance costs (Freund and Spatafora, 2005).
9   
The level of remittances r per family member in the home country is  , where 
 ( ) are the formal (informal) remittance levels. As is implicitly assumed in the debate on 
ways to reduce formal remitting costs, Freund and Spatafora (2005) find that formal and informal 
remittance channels are substitutes, with informal remittances 
I F r r r + =
F r I r
= I r ( ) 0 / , > φ φ d dr r I I . The data 
used in the empirical analysis consist of formal or officially recorded remittances  . Since  F r





dr I F − =  and  0 <
φ d
drI , it follows that the change in   associated with a decrease in 
*
F r φ  
                                                 
9 These include the explicit fees charged by these institutions, the exchange rate premium they obtain in the 
conversion of foreign currency remittances into local currency, and the time and other costs incurred by 
having to go to a different location to obtain the remittances.  
 
  8is larger and more likely to be positive than the change in 
* r . Thus, it is not entirely surprising 
that Freund and Spatafora (2005) find in their empirical study of informal remittances that “… the 
cost of sending remittances primarily affects the channel by which money is sent home and not 
the amount” (p. 9).  
From our analysis and Freund and Spatafora’s findings, we conclude that formal 
remittances increase with the level of financial development.  
 
3.4. Increase in Population  
  With an increase in family size L,   falls and  M c ( ) [ ] S N N N c f c f L − + 1 . In other words, 
migrants spend more on their family. With the decline in  ,  M c ) ( M c u′  increases, and thus – by 
equation (3) – so do  ) ( ) ( S N c V c V ′ = ′ , i.e.,  S N c c =   decline as well. Since   and   are 
unchanged,   and 
S y N y
* t
* r   fall, and since  ,  . Thus,   remains 
unchanged. With the increase in L, 
* *
S N dc dc =
* * dr dt =
* * r t − +θ
( ) r t Lf W N − + ′ θ / ) ( . Since    is unchanged 
and   increases, W  must increase. Thus,  , and thus  , must fall.  
* * r t − +θ
*
N f





Since total spending on family members increases and the share of family members in the 
home country,  , increases, it would seem that remittances 
* 1 N f −
* R  increase as well. The only 
case where 
* R  might not increase is if 
* r  falls proportionately more than  , in which case it 
might be possible for a larger share of expenditures to be spent on family members in the host 
country (though only if 
* t
* r   falls sufficiently so that   falls).  Since   and 
,   < 
* *) 1 ( r f N −
* *
S N c c =
S N y y >
* t
* r . Moreover, since  ,  . Thus,   falls proportionately more 
than 
* *
S N dc dc =
* * dr dt =
* t
* r . Consequently, a larger share of total expenditures on family members is spent in the 
home country, and since total expenditures increase, 
* R  increases.  
  9  In conclusion, an increase in home country population results in a decrease in per capita 
remittances 
* r  and in an increase in total remittances
* R .  
 
3.5. Expected Economic Growth 
Assume now that individuals are risk neutral and live for two periods, with all decisions 
made in period 1. Thus, individuals migrate, bring family members to the host country, give them 
transfers and send remittances to those staying in their home country in period 1. For simplicity, 
the interest rate and migrants’ subjective discount rate are assumed equal to zero, though all 
qualitative results also hold as well under positive values for these two rates.  
Migrants’ utility function is given by: 
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i) = expected consumption (income) in 
period 2 (i = M, N, S). The budget constraints are:  
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where    are the (present value of) lifetime consumption and income, 
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For simplicity, and without impact on the qualitative results, u and V are assumed to be 
symmetric in their arguments, so that  . The optimum is given by:  
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  10 
What is the impact of an increase in  ? For a given 
e
S y
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Thus, both an increase in current income    (see Section 3.2) and an increase in 






The model leads to predictions on the remittance impact of most of the variables of 
interest. The main predictions are:   
i)  An increase in current income in has a negative impact on remittances;  
ii)  An increase in expected future income has a negative impact on remittances;  
iii)  An increase in financial development has a positive impact on remittances; 
iv)  An increase in population has a positive impact on remittances; and 
v)  An increase in migrants’ education level has an ambiguous impact on 
remittances. 
  
4. Education and Remittances: What Do Regional Aggregates Show?    
The mean values of some of the key country-level variables are presented in Table 1 for 
the year 2000. The first column shows that the ratio of remittances to GDP is equal to 2.95% in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 3.38% in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and 2.47% in 
South Asia. Countries with smaller ratios of remittances to GDP are Latin America and the 
  11Caribbean (LAC) at 1.31%, Eastern and Central Europe at .88%, East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 
at .58% and Western Europe at .48%. Thus, poorer regions (see last column of Table 1) have 
higher remittance-to-GDP ratios than the richer ones.  
The second column shows a high degree of variation in the migrant-to-population ratio, 
from a low of .21% in South Asia to a high of 3.56% in Western Europe, with the latter mainly 
due to intra-European labor flows. It is clear that the size of the regions’ population has an 
important impact on that ratio. For instance, the ratio for Western Europe would be substantially 
smaller if the region consisted of fewer countries.     
Evidence on migrants’ education level is from Docquier and Marfouk (2006). It shows 
that more than half of the migrants from SSA and South Asia have tertiary education, and that 
migrants are significantly more educated than the rest of the population for all the regions. The 
ratio of the share of the educated in total migrants divided by their share in the home country 
population (i.e., the third to the fourth columns), which Docquier and Marfouk (2006) refer to as 
the “schooling gap”, is lowest in Western Europe (34.3/18.63 or about 1.8), followed by Eastern 
and Central Europe (2.6), MENA and LAC (3.2), and substantially higher schooling gaps for 
EAP (7.6), South Asia (12.6) and SSA (15.9). Given these figures, it is no wonder that the brain 
drain has become an issue of great concern in developing regions, especially in South Asia and 
SSA – the poorest ones – where the problem is particularly acute.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
5. Econometric Specification




i i i i i i
Edu
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6
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  (8) 
  12 
where REMi denotes remittances (or per capita remittances), MIGi is the log of migrants or the 
ratio of migrants to population, FDi is the level of financial sector development (measured as the 
ratio of bank deposits to GDP), GDPi and PCGDPi (per capita GDP) are measured in PPP terms, 
 is the expected growth rate of GDP, Edu
e
i GDPgrowth i is the ratio of migrants with tertiary 
education to the total number of migrants, and εi is an error term.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation. A few things 
stand out. First, log remittances, most instruments, and over fifty percent of the independent 
variables, exhibit high coefficients of variation, a desirable feature for estimation purposes. 
Second, the average share of migrants with tertiary education is large at close to 40%, and so is 
the tertiary school enrollment rate at close to 25%. 
  The migrants and migrants’ education variables are endogenous since sending 
remittances is a major motivation for migration and a number of micro-econometric studies have 
shown that remittances have a positive impact on education (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; 
Duryea et al., 2005; Yang and Martinez, 2006; Mansuri, 2007).  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
The instruments used for migration are: the great-circle distance between home and host 
countries, the cost of obtaining a passport as a share of per capita GDP, and dummy variables for 
home countries that are landlocked, islands, officially recognizes dual citizenship, and where 
English is spoken. Distance raises costs has a significant and robust negative impact on 
remittances and reduces migration (Mayda, 2006), and similarly for passport costs (McKenzie, 
2005) and the two location dummies, while recognition of dual citizenship and English spoken 
lower migration costs and raise migration. 
  13The migrant’ education variable used is the share of tertiary educated migrants in total 
migrants. As mentioned above, a number of studies have shown that remittances have a positive 
impact on school attainment in home countries. This reverse causality suggests that accounting 
for potential endogeneity bias is likely to be important. Instruments used in the IV estimation are 
the home country’s log of public spending on education, the tertiary school enrollment rate, and 
the number of tertiary educated migrants in the US relative to the population size of their origin 
country in 1970, all of which should (and actually do) raise migrants’ education level.  
 
6. Data  
The data covers the eighty two countries for which we have observations on all the 
variables for the year 2000. Aggregate data on remittances are from the IMF Balance of Payments 
statistics, and consist – according to the standard definition – of the sum of workers’ remittances, 
compensation of employees and migrant transfers. Data on the number of migrants in OECD 
countries, and on migrants with tertiary education relative to all migrants, are from Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006). The cost of acquiring a national passport as a percentage of GDP per capita is 
obtained from McKenzie (2005). The ratio of bank deposits to GDP, our financial sector 
development variable, is from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Most of the other 
variables are from the World Development Indicators. The Appendix provides a description of the 
variables and their sources in more details. 
 
7. Estimation Results
Equation (8) is estimated by both OLS and instrumental variables (IV) methods.  
 
7.1. OLS Estimation
We estimate three regressions, with remittances measured either as the log of remittances 
or of remittances per capita. OLS results are shown in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.  As expected, 
  14we obtain positive semi-elasticities of remittances and per capita remittances with respect to the 
ratio of migration to population in columns (1) and (2), significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively, and a positive elasticity of remittances with respect to the number of migrants, with 
a value of .361 and significant at the 10% level (column (3)).  
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
The impact of migrants’ education level on remittances is negative and significant at the 
5% level in two of three specifications (columns (1) and (2)). The negative sign of the 
coefficients implies that migrants with tertiary education remit less than less-educated migrants. 
The impact of home countries’ financial sector development is positive, though not significant. 
As predicted by the model, the elasticity of remittances with respect to per capita GDP in 
columns (2) and (3) is negative, with values of -.792 and -.562, respectively, and significant at the 
1% level. Interestingly, the elasticity of per capita remittances with respect to per capita GDP is 
positive in column (1). This might be the case if the variation in   is large relative to that of 
, which seems to be the case as the coefficient of variation of   is very small 
(.09). 
L log
GDP log GDP log
10
The elasticity of remittances with respect to GDP in columns 2 and 3 is .860 and .531, 
respectively, significant at the 1% level. This may reflect the fact that, for given per capita GDP, 
a larger economy offers greater investment opportunities, resulting in an increase in remittances.  
The 2000 per capita GDP already captures the economic growth during the 1995-1999 
period, suggesting that the latter can be interpreted as the expectation in 2000 of the future rate of 
                                                 
10  Since  ()


















positive and small (.15), this may explain the positive elasticity obtained in column (1). 
 
  15growth. As predicted by the model, the expected growth variable has a negative impact on 
remittances, significant at the 10% in two of the three regressions.  
Finally, the model predicts a positive (negative) impact of population on total (per capita) 
remittances 
* R  (
* r ). These results are confirmed in the empirical analysis. Keeping GDP 
constant, the elasticity of remittances with respect to population is found to be .792 in column (2) 
and .562 in column (3), significant at the 1% level, and the elasticity of per capita remittances 
with respect to population is -.399, significant at the 5% level (column (1)).    
 
7.2. IV Estimation
Both the migration and migrants’ education variables are instrumented in this case, with 
the instruments described in Section 5. Results are reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table 3. The 
Hansen J-statistics for overidentification are reported at the bottom of Table 3.  The results 
support the validity of our instruments. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
What are the main differences between the OLS and IV results? First, the ratio of 
migrants to population is positive but not significant in the regression in column 5.
11 Secondly, as 
predicted by the model, the positive impact of financial sector development is now significant in 
the regressions of total remittances. Thirdly, and most importantly, the impact of migrants’ 
education on remittances is now significant in all three regressions. Faini (2007) also found a 
negative impact of migrants’ education on remittances in various regressions but none of them 
were significant.  
                                                 
11 However, given our prior that an increase in the number of migrants raises remittance levels, a one-tailed 
test might be in order, in which case it is significant at the 1% level. 
  16Thus, the claim that the negative impact of the brain drain on migrants’ countries of 
origin is mitigated by the fact that more educated migrants remit more to their families back home 
than less educated ones is not supported by the evidence.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on remittances and migrants’ 
education. It presents a richer model than in previous studies and derives additional testable 
hypotheses. Second, it shows that remittances decrease with the share of migrants who possess a 
tertiary education, a result that had so far not been demonstrated. Third, it accounts for the 
endogeneity of migration and migrants’ education level, something previous studies have 
abstracted from, and provides a richer empirical analysis that enables us to estimate the 
relationship between remittances and other variables of interest, including home countries’ 
expected economic growth, income, population, and level of financial development. As predicted 
by the model, the paper shows that per capita income and expected economic growth have a 
negative impact on total and per capita remittances, while the size of the population, national 
income and the level of financial sector development have a positive impact.  
The main finding that an increase in the share of migrants with tertiary education has a 
negative impact on total and per capita remittances contradicts the claim that the negative impact 
of the brain drain can be mitigated or even offset by the fact that skilled migrants remit more than 
unskilled ones. These findings thus provide an additional source of concern about the brain drain 
for countries of origin. This should raise the urgency of finding (non-distortive) ways to reinforce 
skilled migrants’ links with their country of origin. This might possibly be achieved as part of a 
cooperative arrangement between source and (their principal) host countries, including policies of 
return and circular migration (Schiff, 2007).  
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  19Table 1: Summary Statistics (mean values) by Geographic Region 












tertiary edu. in 
home countries 
(%) 




         
Latin America and Caribbean  1.31        
        
        
        
        
        
        
    
        
2.39 37.61 11.69 7,378
Western Europe  0.48 3.56 34.30 18.63 24,569
Eastern and Central Europe  0.88 1.55 44.98 17.45 7,798
Middle East and North Africa  3.38 2.09 30.34 9.37 5,396
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.95 0.39 55.37 3.48 2,282
South Asia  2.47 0.21 55.34 4.38 2,203




Sample average  1.44 0.91 48.26 7.92 6,386
Source: IFS (IMF), WDI (World Bank), Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 
Note: Sample size = 82 countries. Figures are weighted by the population. They are based on the mean values for the period  
1998-2002 except for the ratio of migrants to population and the ratio of migrants with tertiary education to total migrants,  
which are the figures for the year 2000.  
  20Table 2: List of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
  Mean SD 
    
Dependent variables    
Log of remittances  19.53  1.98 
Log of remittances per capita  3.23  1.61 
    
Independent variables    
Log of migrants abroad  12.20  1.64 
Ratio of migrants abroad to population size (%)  4.59  7.36 
Ratio of bank deposit to GDP  0.46  0.28 
Log of GDP (in PPP)  24.22  2.25 
Log of GDP per capita (in PPP)  8.73  1.09 
Expected GDP growth rate [1995-99 annual growth rate (%)]  3.78  2.25 
Ratio of migrants with tertiary education to total number of 
migrants (%)  39.58 14.06 
    
Instrumental variables    
Log of distance (km)  1.17  0.97 
Passport cost (% of GDP per capita)  3.04  5.78 
Dummy for English language  0.32   
Island dummy  0.16   
Landlock dummy  0.16   
Dummy for dual citizenship  0.43   
Log of public spending on education, ppp  21.82  2.04 
Tertiary school enrollment rate (%)  24.67  19.56 
Ratio of tertiary educated migrants in the US to the origin 
country’s population in 1970 (%) 
0.06 0.09 
Note: All the variables are the mean values for the period between 1998-2002 except for the logarithm of 
migrants abroad, the ratio of migrants to population, and the ratio of migrants with tertiary education which 
are the figures for the year 2000. The public spending on education and tertiary school enrollment rate are 
the mean values for the period between 1990-2000. They are unweighted means. As for legal rights and 
credit information indices, we took the figures for the closet year (2004 or 2005) to the year 2000. 
 
 
  21Table 3: OLS and IV Regression Results for Determinants of Remittances 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of Rem
per capita
Log of Rem Log of Rem
Log of Rem
per capita
Log of Rem Log of Rem
Migrants/population 0.073*** 0.050** 0.129*** 0.052
[0.020] [0.022] [0.035] [0.038]
Log of migrants 0.361* 0.463*
[0.183] [0.265]
Ratio of migrants with tertiary edu. -0.022** -0.024** -0.012 -0.027* -0.084** -0.062*
[0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.016] [0.035] [0.037]
Bank deposit/GDP 0.784 1.028 1.110 0.785 1.559* 1.527*
[0.887] [0.692] [0.675] [0.843] [0.831] [0.799]
Log of GDP 0.860*** 0.531*** 0.980*** 0.573***
[0.121] [0.113] [0.176] [0.182]
Log of GDP per capita 0.399** -0.792*** -0.562*** 0.343* -1.124*** -0.822***
[0.183] [0.223] [0.203] [0.181] [0.316] [0.298]
Expected GDP growth -0.128* -0.107 -0.111* -0.129** -0.115 -0.116*
[0.067] [0.070] [0.065] [0.061] [0.071] [0.066]
Constant 0.392 6.274*** 7.550*** 0.831 8.413*** 9.341***
[1.375] [2.297] [1.987] [1.557] [3.038] [2.537]
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2 0.41 0.62 0.64 0.35 0.45 0.50
F-statistic (p-value) 12.33 (0.00) 18.69 (0.00) 18.30 (0.00) 16.10 (0.00) 14.67 (0.00) 15.46 (0.00)
Overidentification χ2 (p-value) 5.41 (0.25) 3.22 (0.36) 1.14 (0.77)
OLS IV
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; *(**)(***) is 10 (5) (1) % significance level; Data is for 2000; 
Expected growth rate is the average growth rate over the period 1995-1999. 
  22Appendix. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable name  Description  Source 
    
Remittances (R) to 
GDP 
R/GDP (%), R = workers’ remittances + compensation of 
employees + migrants’ transfers (App. A in Freund-Spatafora 
2005). 
Balance of Payments Statistics 
(IMF) 
Log of remittances  Log of remittances (constant 2000 US$), which are calculated by 
multiplying the ratio of remittances to GDP by GDP figures. 
Remittances: BoP Statistics 
(IMF), GDP:  WDI 
Log of remit. per capita  Log of remittances per capita (constant 2000 US$).  Remittances: BoP Statistics 
(IMF), Population:  WDI 
Log of migrants   Log of total number of migrants in OECD countries.  Docquier and Marfouk (2006 ) 
Migrants/popul.   Ratio of migrants in OECD to population size of home countries 
(%). 
cf. above 
Univ. educated to total 
migrants 
Ratio of tertiary educated to total number of migrants (%).  cf. above 
Bank deposits to GDP  Bank deposit to GDP = {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t)+F(t-1)/Pe(t-1)]}/   
[GDP(t)/Pa(t)], F = demand + time + saving deposits.  
IFS (IMF) 
Log GDP  Log of GDP (constant 2000 US$).  WDI 
LogGDP per cap   Log of GDP per capita, ppp adjusted (constant 2000 int’l).  WDI 
Expected GDP growth  Average GDP growth rates for 1995-1999 (annual %).  WDI 
English language 
dummy 
Equal to 1 = countries where English commonly spoken.  Docquier (2006), CIA World 
Factbook 
Log of distance  Log of host to home country great-circle distance. For USA, 
Canada, EU, Australia, New Zealand: zero distance; Eastern and 
Central Europe, Middle East, Africa: average distance to EU 
countries weighted by number of migrants; Central Am., Mex., 
Caribbean, South Am.: distance to USA; South Asia, East Asia 
and Pacific: distance to USA/Canada and EU countries weighted 
by number of migrants. 
Authors’ calculations based on 
data from CIA World 
Factbook 
Passport cost to GDP 
per capita 
Passport cost normalized by countries’ GDP per capita, in US $, 
inflation adjusted (%)=(passport cost/(current $ GDP per capita) 
*100/(1+infl. 90/100)(1+infl. 91/100)…(1+infl. 2004/100). 
Passport cost: Mc Kenzie 
(2005), GDP: WDI  
Island dummy  Country being an island (1= home country is an island).  Docquier (2006) and CIA 
World Factbook 
Landlock dummy  Country being landlocked (1 = home country being landlocked).  Cf. above 
Dual citizenship  Country legally recognizes dual citizenship (1 indicates that home 
country recognizes the dual citizenship). 
US Office of Personal Mngmt. 
Investigations Service (2001) 
Citizenship Laws of the World. 
Log public expend.  on 
education 
Log of public spending on education, ppp adjusted (constant 2000 
int’l). 
WDI 
Tertiary enroll. rate   Rate of tertiary school enrollment (%)  WDI 
Tertiary educated 
migrants in the US to 
the origin country’s 
population in 1970 
Ratio of tertiary educated migrants in the US to the origin 
country’s population in 1970 (%) 
Migrants: US Census (2000), 
Population: WDI  
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